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Abstract  
This paper analyzes the effects of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits on 
unemployment exits and subsequent labor market outcomes. We exploit a 
piecewise linear relationship between the previous wage and UI benefits in 
Finland to identify the causal effects of the benefit level by using a regression 
kink design. According to our findings, higher benefits lengthen nonemployment 
spells and decrease time spent in part-time unemployment, and thus result in 
more full-time unemployment. Also the re-employment probability and post-
unemployment wage are negatively affected. The results for the duration of the 
first post-unemployment job are not conclusive, but in total both employment 
and earnings in the two years following the beginning of the unemployment spell 
decrease with higher benefits. 
Key words: Unemployment duration, job match quality, unemployment 
insurance, regression kink design 
JEL classes: J64, J65  
1 Introduction
There is a vast empirical literature showing that more generous unemployment insurance
(UI) beneﬁts prolong unemployment (see Tatsiramos and van Ours, 2014 for a survey).
However, more generous UI beneﬁts may also have favorable eﬀects by, for example,
improving subsequent job matches. Job seekers with more generous beneﬁts can search
longer for a job that matches their skills and may, therefore, ﬁnd more stable and better
paid jobs (Ehrenberg and Oaxaca, 1976; Marimon and Zilibotti, 1999; Acemoglu and
Shimer, 2000). On the other hand, if human capital depreciates during unemployment
or if employers discriminate against applicants based on their unemployment history, the
eﬀect of generous UI beneﬁts on match quality can also be negative. Empirical evidence
to date is mixed and it is unclear which eﬀect dominates, i.e. do more generous beneﬁts
improve or impair match quality. This is an important topic because longer unemployment
spells caused by higher beneﬁts are more (less) acceptable when they lead to better (worse)
matches between job seekers and vacant jobs.
In this study, we ﬁnd that higher UI beneﬁts prolong nonemployment duration and
decrease the post-unemployment wage rate. As such, the eﬀect of the beneﬁt level on
labor market prospects over a longer time period is unambiguously negative. We reach
this conclusion using a regression kink design and rich register-based data covering the
entire population of unemployed workers in Finland. Our research design exploits the
relationship between the previous wage and UI beneﬁts. The piecewise linear beneﬁt rule
allows us to identify the causal eﬀect of the beneﬁt level on various outcomes (see Card
et al., 2015, and references therein).
Our ﬁndings indicate that higher UI beneﬁts prolong nonemployment duration with
an elasticity around 1.5 to 2. We also examine the eﬀect of the UI beneﬁt level on
the duration of UI beneﬁt receipt, but the results are not conclusive. We ﬁnd that
higher UI beneﬁts lead to a decrease in the share of days spent on partial unemployment
beneﬁts, i.e. in subsidized part-time or temporary jobs. The elasticity of the share
of partial unemployment days in the UI spell with respect to the beneﬁt level is quite
large in absolute value, approximately −5 in most cases, but the average share of partial
unemployment days is low to begin with, implying a modest absolute eﬀect. According to
our results, the probability that the UI spell ends in employment decreases with a higher
beneﬁt level, with an elasticity around −0.5. Higher beneﬁts also reduce the wage in the
ﬁrst job after unemployment with an elasticity of around −0.5 to −1. On the other hand,
the estimated elasticity of the duration of the next job with respect to the beneﬁt level
is in general positive, which is somewhat surprising considering our results for the wage
rate. The estimates for job duration are, however, very imprecise and hence essentially
uninformative.
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To assess the overall eﬀect of UI beneﬁts we consider cumulative working days and
earnings in the two years following the beginning of the unemployment spell. We ﬁnd that
earnings decrease with higher UI beneﬁts with an elasticity of −1 to −2. This earnings
eﬀect is inﬂuenced by decreasing working days as we ﬁnd that the elasticity of the number
of working days in the following two years with respect to the UI beneﬁt level is −0.5 to
−1. The ﬁnding that higher UI beneﬁts decrease subsequent working days is obviously
at least in part driven by potentially longer nonemployment spells and is consistent with
our observation that higher beneﬁts lead to less part-time and temporary employment.
All in all, the overall eﬀect of UI beneﬁts on labor market outcomes over the period of
two years is negative.
As in previous regression kink design studies, our results are quite sensitive to the
choices of bandwidth and polynomial order. Since no single optimal procedure to make
such choices exists, we report a range of nonparametric estimates based on local linear
and quadratic speciﬁcations using various bandwidth selectors. In addition, we use a more
parametric approach with additional covariates and larger samples to increase eﬃciency.
The negative eﬀect of the UI beneﬁt level on the share of days spent on partial unemploy-
ment beneﬁts is robust to changes in the speciﬁcation and bandwidth, as are the eﬀects
on post-unemployment earnings. The results for the other outcomes are more sensitive
to changes in the estimation method.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the eﬀects of UI generosity on unemployment
and post-unemployment outcomes. Our estimates for the eﬀects of the UI beneﬁt level
on nonemployment duration are quite imprecise and large compared to the majority
of previous elasticity estimates, but are in line with results from Sweden (Carling et
al., 2001). Estimates for the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to the
beneﬁt level from previous studies using a regression kink design have also been high in
comparison to those usually found in the literature (Card et al., 2015).
Previous empirical evidence on the eﬀects of the beneﬁt level on subsequent labor
market outcomes is scarce and the results are mixed.1 Addison and Blackburn (2000)
ﬁnd that higher UI beneﬁts have hardly any eﬀect on subsequent wages in the US labor
market, but Centeno (2004) shows that higher beneﬁts increase the duration of the subse-
quent employment spell. Ek (2013) ﬁnds evidence that higher UI beneﬁts decrease annual
earnings and monthly wages in Sweden, while the probability of re-employment and em-
1The studies that consider the eﬀects of UI on match quality have mostly analyzed the impacts of
potential beneﬁt duration. The results of these studies are also mixed, with some studies ﬁnding a positive
association between beneﬁt duration and post-unemployment job quality in terms of either higher wages
or job stability (e.g. Tatsiramos, 2009; Centeno and Novo, 2009; Gaure et al., 2008; Nekoei and Weber,
2015) and others showing negative or no eﬀects of longer beneﬁt durations on match quality (e.g. Degen
and Lalive, 2013; Lalive, 2007; Caliendo et al., 2013, Card et al., 2007, van Ours and Vodopivec, 2008;
Le Barbanchon, 2016, Schmieder et al. 2016).
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ployment durations do not appear to be aﬀected. Using Spanish data, Rebollo-Sanz and
Rodriguez-Planas (2016) ﬁnd no eﬀect on post-unemployment wages and no decrease in
other measures of match quality.
Our results are in line with the Swedish evidence on post-unemployment earnings
and contrary to previous research, indicate that also the re-employment probability and
working days in the next two years are aﬀected negatively by a higher UI beneﬁt level.
Previous studies have not examined the eﬀect of the beneﬁt level on time spent in partial
unemployment. Our ﬁnding that higher UI beneﬁts decrease the share of days in subsi-
dized part-time and temporary employment during the UI spell provides new evidence on
a potential mechanism through which the generosity of UI beneﬁts can aﬀect subsequent
labor market outcomes.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the Finnish UI
system during the period under investigation. This is followed by a section discussing
our identiﬁcation strategy and estimation procedures. Section 4 introduces our data and
section 5 contains graphical evidence. Section 6 discusses our estimation results. The
ﬁnal section concludes.
2 Institutional framework
In Finland, earnings-related UI beneﬁts are paid by unemployment funds, most of which
are organized along the industry or occupation lines, and administrated by labor unions.
Membership is voluntary, but as many as 85% of all workers are enrolled in unemployment
funds (Uusitalo and Verho, 2010). A worker who registers as an unemployed job seeker
at the public employment agency is entitled to 500 days of UI beneﬁts provided that he
or she has been a member of an unemployment fund for at least 10 months (membership
condition) and has worked for at least 34 weeks during the past 28 months (employment
condition). The beneﬁts are paid for 5 days a week, so the maximum beneﬁt duration is
100 calendar weeks. If the UI recipient leaves unemployment without exhausting his or her
beneﬁts, and then returns to unemployment before satisfying the employment condition
again, he or she will be entitled to unused UI beneﬁts from the previous spell (given that
he or she did not leave the labor market for a period longer than 6 months without an
acceptable reason). Those who exhaust their UI beneﬁts can claim a means-tested, ﬂat-
rate labor market subsidy, which is paid by the Social Security Institution for an indeﬁnite
period.2
2Those unemployed who do not belong to an unemployment fund but satisfy the employment condition
are eligible for a ﬂat-rate basic allowance which is the same amount as the labor market subsidy but is not
means-tested and is paid for a period of 500 days. In practice, this beneﬁt type is of minor importance
and their recipients are not covered in our analysis.
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Figure 1: Daily wage and UI beneﬁt level (EUR)
Individuals who participate in labor market training programs receive a labor mar-
ket training subsidy. Because this subsidy equals the unemployment beneﬁt the worker
would have otherwise received plus a daily allowance for maintenance and possibly for
accommodation, we make no distinction between earnings-related labor market training
subsidies and UI beneﬁts in our analysis. Furthermore, an unemployed worker who takes
up a part-time job (or a very short full-time job) does not necessarily lose his or her ben-
eﬁts entirely but may be entitled to a reduced amount of beneﬁts. In exchange for these
partial beneﬁts, the worker is expected to continue his or her search for full-time employ-
ment. The entitlement period for a worker on partial UI beneﬁts elapses at a reduced rate
proportional to the ratio of the partial beneﬁt to full-time beneﬁt. Due to part-time un-
employment and labor market training, UI recipients can collect earnings-related beneﬁts
longer than 500 days.
The UI beneﬁt consists of a basic component equal to the full amount of the labor
market subsidy and an earnings-related component. The latter is 45% of the diﬀerence
between the previous daily wage (the monthly earnings divided by 21.5) and the basic
daily component up to a previous daily wage of 107 EUR (in 2009). There is no cap on
the beneﬁt level but daily wages exceeding 107 EUR increase the beneﬁt by only 20%
of the exceeding amount. The daily beneﬁt cannot exceed 90% of the underlying daily
wage which restricts the beneﬁt amount at low levels of earnings. Figure 1 illustrates
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the relationship between UI beneﬁts and previous daily wage in 2009. The ﬁrst vertical
line corresponds to the basic component, and between the ﬁrst and second vertical lines
the afore mentioned rule of max 90% replacement ratio is in eﬀect. The third vertical
line corresponds to the daily wage of 107 EUR with wages exceeding this level increasing
beneﬁts by only 20% of the exceeding amount.3
There are a few exceptions in the beneﬁt rules described above. First, workers with
at least 20 years of employment history who have been a member of an unemployment
fund for at least ﬁve years and who were dismissed without cause can receive a higher
beneﬁt for up to 185 days. Second, starting in 2005 workers with at least three years
of employment history who were dismissed without cause or who worked for the same
employer under ﬁxed-term contracts for at least 36 months within the past 42 months
have had an option to enroll in an employment program. Participants of this program are
entitled to higher UI beneﬁts for 20 days and a higher labor market training subsidy for
the duration of training programs that are speciﬁed in an individual-speciﬁc action plan.
Finally, workers aged 59 or more (57 or more for those born before 1950) on the day when
regular UI beneﬁts expire are entitled to extended UI beneﬁts until retirement. We do
not consider these groups of workers with diﬀering beneﬁt schedules in our analysis.
3 Statistical methods
3.1 Identiﬁcation
To identify the eﬀect of UI beneﬁts we take advantage of the kink in the beneﬁt rule that
determines the beneﬁt level as a function of past daily wage (i.e the change in the slope
at 107 EUR in ﬁgure 1). The basic idea is that a kink in the relationship between the
outcome variable (e.g. unemployment duration) and the past wage at the kink point of the
beneﬁt rule is indicative of the causal eﬀect of beneﬁts under the identifying assumption
that the direct eﬀect of past wage on the outcome is smooth at that point. This approach
is known as regression kink design (RKD) due to Nielsen et. al (2010), and it is a close
cousin of the regression discontinuity design. While the regression discontinuity design
identiﬁes the causal eﬀect from a jump in the average outcome associated with a jump in
the policy variable, the regression kink design identiﬁes the causal eﬀect from a kink in
the average outcome associated with a kink in the policy variable.
3There is a ﬁxed supplement to the daily beneﬁt corresponding to the number of dependent children.
The beneﬁt increases stepwise for one, two and three or more children, without aﬀecting the size of the
kink at 107 EUR.
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To ﬁx ideas, consider the following stylized model
Y = α + τB + ε, (1)
where Y is an outcome (e.g. unemployment duration or post-unemployment earnings),
B = b(W ) is the daily UI beneﬁt, which is a deterministic function of the previous daily
wage W with a kink at W = w∗, and ε is an error term. The parameter of interest
is τ, the causal eﬀect of the UI beneﬁt on the outcome Y. Because both Y and W are
labor market outcomes and presumably aﬀected by the same unobserved characteristics,
the unemployed who received diﬀerent wages on their previous jobs are likely to have
diﬀerent expected Y due to unobserved factors, and therefore E (ε|W ) 6= 0. Since B is a
function of W, the OLS estimate of τ from (1) would be biased due to the endogeneity of
B. To deal with this problem, we can augment the model by adding a control function
deﬁned as g(W ) ≡ E (ε|W ):
Y = α + τB + g(W ) + υ, (2)
where B and W are mean-independent of the new error term υ by construction. How-
ever, the eﬀect of B cannot be distinguished from the direct eﬀect of W without further
assumptions. Nielsen et al. (2010) show that if g (·) is continuously diﬀerentiable without
having a kink at W = w∗, then
τ =
limw↓w∗ dE (Y |W = w) /dw − limw↑w∗ dE (Y |W = w) /dw
limw↓w∗ b′(w)− limw↑w∗ b′(w) . (3)
The RKD estimand, the right-hand side of (3), equals the ratio of the change in the
slope of the conditional expectation of the outcome variable to the change in the slope
of the deterministic beneﬁt rule at the cutoﬀ w∗. Thus, despite the endogeneity of the
UI beneﬁt, its causal eﬀect is identiﬁed without any assumptions about g (·) except the
smoothness.
Given the result in (3) we could estimate τ by regressing Y on B while controlling
for the direct eﬀect of W using some ﬂexible but smooth function. Alternatively, we can
invoke the relationship in (3) directly. This latter approach is more general as it does not
hinge on the assumption that the regression function is additively separable. Namely, Card
et al. (2015) show that the RKD estimand can be interpreted as the average treatment
eﬀect in a more general, nonseparable model of the form
Y = y(B,W, ε), (4)
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which allows for unrestricted heterogeneity in the eﬀect of B. They show that for this
model the RKD estimand identiﬁes
E
(
∂y(b∗, w∗, ε)
∂b
∣∣∣∣∣B = b∗,W = w∗
)
, (5)
where b∗ = b (w∗) and the expectation is taken with respect to the conditional distribution
of ε given B = b∗ and W = w∗. This parameter is known as the treatment on the
treated (Florens et al. 2008) or local average response (Altonji and Matzkin 2005), and
it equals the average eﬀect of a marginal increase in b at the point (b∗, w∗) holding ﬁxed
the conditional distribution of unobservable characteristics.
3.2 Estimation
Card et al. (2015, 2016) discuss nonparametric inference using local polynomial regres-
sions. Since the denominator of the RKD estimand is known in our case, we only need an
estimate of the numerator. The nonparametric estimation of the conditional expectation
of the outcome variable amounts to solving
(
α−, β−p
)
and
(
α+, β+p
)
, p = 1, 2, . . . P, by
minimizing the objective functions
∑
i∈Ω−
Yi − α− − P∑
p=1
β−p (wi − w∗)p
2K (wi − w∗
h
)
and ∑
i∈Ω+
Yi − α+ − P∑
p=1
β+p (wi − w∗)p
2K (wi − w∗
h
)
where P is the order of the polynomial function, K (·) is a kernel function, h is a band-
width, Ω− and Ω+ are the set of observations below and above the wage cutoﬀ w∗ re-
spectively. An estimate for the average local treatment eﬀect is obtained by dividing the
estimate of β+1 − β−1 , the numerator of the RKD estimand, with the change in the slope
of the beneﬁt rule at w∗.
If the uniform kernel is used, which is the leading choice in the applied work, the
estimation problem reduces to OLS estimation of the model
E (Y |W = w) = α + δ0D +
P∑
p=1
[βp (w − w∗)p + δpD (w − w∗)p] , (6)
where D = 1 {w > w∗} is an indicator for observations with the previous wage above
the cutoﬀ, using a subsample of observations in a neighborhood of the cutoﬀ that satisfy
the condition |w − w∗| ≤ h. Because δ1 is the change in the slope of the conditional
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expectation of Y at w∗, we can obtain an estimate of τ by dividing the OLS estimate of
δ1 with the change in the slope of the beneﬁt rule at w
∗.
In addition to the kernel function, we also need to choose the bandwidth h and the
polynomial order P . The bandwidth is a trade-oﬀ between the precision of the estimates
and accuracy of the polynomial approximation to the unknown underlying expectation
function. Several competing bandwidth selector methods have been proposed. Calonico
et al. (2014) argue that the commonly used bandwidth selectors tend to yield bandwidths
that are too large to ensure the validity of the underlying distributional approximations.
As a result, the RKD estimates may be subject to a non-negligible bias and the resulting
conﬁdence intervals can be severely biased. They propose an alternative method where
the RKD point estimate is corrected by an estimated bias term, and the standard error
estimates are adjusted for additional variability that results from the estimation of the
bias correction term. This procedure yields bias-corrected point estimates and conﬁdence
intervals that are more robust to the bandwidth choice than the conventional methods.
Calonico et al. (2014) also introduce a new method to choose the bandwidth such that
the point estimator is mean square error (MSE) optimal. More recently Calonico et al.
(2016a) develop further bandwidth selection procedures, including bandwidth selectors
that minimize the coverage error rate (CER) of the robust bias-corrected conﬁdence in-
terval, which may be preferred for inference purposes.
Card et al. (2015, 2016) compare conventional nonparametric RKD estimates to their
bias-corrected alternatives obtained using diﬀerent polynomial orders and bandwidth se-
lectors and using both real-world data and simulated data. They argue that in some
cases  including their analysis of the eﬀects of UI beneﬁts on unemployment duration
using Austrian data  the uncorrected linear RKD model can produce more useful esti-
mates than the bias-correction procedure of Calonico et al. (2014), which may come at
the cost of a substantial loss in precision with possibly only a small reduction in bias.
This is because when the bias term is imprecisely estimated, the overall variance of the
bias-corrected estimator can be much higher. Moreover, Card et al. (2015) claim that the
MSE-optimal bandwidth selector discussed in Calonico et al. (2014) yields bandwidths
that are too small in their empirical setting, and therefore they advocate the use of the
same bandwidth selector but without the regularization term which reﬂects the variance
in the bias estimation and guards against large bandwidths.
When it comes to the choice of the polynomial order, linear (P = 1) and quadratic
(P = 2) models have been typically used in nonparametric analysis. Calonico et al.
(2014) state that the local quadratic estimator is preferable to the local linear estimator
in the RKD setting due to boundary bias considerations, whereas Card et al. (2014,
2016) argue that the best choice of polynomial order in MSE sense depends on the sample
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size and the (unknown) derivative of the conditional expectation function E (Y |W = w)
(and E (B|W = w) in the fuzzy RKD settings) in the particular data set. In empirical
applications, the polynomial models have often been compared using some information
criteria.
In general, RKD estimates have been found to be rather sensitive with respect to
polynomial order and bandwidth choices (but not to the choice of the kernel function).
This is unfortunate as there is no consensus on how these choices should be made. Calonico
et al. (2014) advocate the use of the bias-corrected estimates from the quadratic model
using their selector for the optimal bandwidth. Card et al. (2015, 2016) seem to favor
uncorrected estimates from the linear model based on the rule-of-thumb bandwidth of
Fan and Gijbels (1996) or the MSE-optimal bandwidth selector of Calonico et al. (2014)
without the regularization term. Aldo (2016) points out that local linear estimates can
be biased due to confounding nonlinearities and recommends a more parametric approach
where control variables are added to eliminate or mitigate the bias.
In our analysis, we present a range of conventional and bias-corrected nonparametric
local linear and quadratic estimates using alternative bandwidth selectors to provide a
clear picture of the sensitivity of our estimates to these choices. We also conduct more
parametric analysis by estimating models from larger subsets of data (i.e. including also
observations far away from the wage cutoﬀ) while controlling for observed individual
characteristics and choosing the polynomial order on the basis of the Akaike information
criteria.
4 Data and descriptive statistics
Our data are drawn from various administrative registers. The primary data source is
the register on job seekers, maintained by the Ministry of Employment and the Economy.
The register covers all registered applicants at the public employment agency. Without
registration as an unemployed job seeker one cannot qualify for unemployment beneﬁts, so
all UI recipients  and many unemployed non-recipients and employed job seekers  should
be included. The register contains information on unemployment spells, labor market
training courses and job placement programs, as well as demographic characteristics, such
as age, gender, education, occupation and living region. However, there is no information
on receipt of unemployment beneﬁts, nor on job spells or earnings.
While UI beneﬁts are paid by individual unemployment funds, each fund must report
the beneﬁts it paid out to the the Insurance Supervisory Authority. From its registers
we obtain information on received UI beneﬁts and earnings-related labor market training
subsidies. In addition, we merge employment and earnings records from the registers of
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the Finnish Centre for Pensions, which is a statutory co-operation body of all providers
of earnings-related pensions in Finland. It keeps comprehensive records on job spells
and earnings for the entire Finnish population, which will be used to determine pension
beneﬁts.
We focus on workers who became unemployed between 2003 and 2007 and who quali-
ﬁed for 500 days of UI beneﬁts. The beginning of the period is restricted by the fact that
there were changes in the beneﬁt schedule before this. We do not consider unemployment
spells that began after 2007 in order to have a long enough follow-up period for post-
unemployment outcomes. Our current data ends in December 2009. We exclude workers
older than 54 (to drop those eligible for extended UI beneﬁts after regular UI beneﬁts)
and those who were eligible for the higher beneﬁt based on long employment history or
due to participating in labor market training based on the action plans. We also exclude
individuals whose UI beneﬁts have been reduced due to other beneﬁts,4 those who began
to collect UI beneﬁts more than 80 days after the date of job separation,5 and those who
have been laid oﬀ temporarily (the temporary layoﬀ status is directly observed in the UI
records). We express daily wages in 2009 EUR using the deﬂator applied to the unem-
ployment beneﬁts, and pool the observations from diﬀerent years by centering around the
wage cutoﬀ. The daily wage is determined during the employment condition weeks and
is the actual wage used as the basis of the beneﬁt payments. In order to eliminate the
kinks at the lower end of the wage distribution, we drop individuals whose daily wage
deviates from the wage cutoﬀ by more than 55 EUR. Finally, we drop 286 observations
that are outside the true beneﬁt schedule. These constitute only 0.14% of our estimation
sample and dropping them enables us to use a sharp regression kink design. After these
restrictions, our estimation sample consists of almost 200,000 unemployment spells.
We consider several unemployment outcomes. One measure is the time to the next
job (or nonemployment duration), which is deﬁned as the number of days between two
consecutive job spells. We deﬁne UI duration as the sum of days on UI beneﬁts and
earnings-related labor market subsidies. We consider a spell as ending in employment
if the person becomes employed for a period of at least four weeks. Shorter breaks are
considered part of the same nonemployment spell and ignored in the measure of unemploy-
ment duration. Our results are robust to variations in this condition. All job placement
programs are observed in the data and transitions into these programs are not regarded
as transitions into employment when calculating the time to the next job or deﬁning
the re-employment status. Periods on partial UI beneﬁts and labor market training are
4Beneﬁts such as home care allowance when taking care of children as well as partial disability pension
can lower the UI beneﬁt an unemployed worker is entitled to. We exclude 2,539 individuals due to such
reductions.
5Our results are robust to varying this restriction between 30 and 90 days.
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included in the unemployment spells and we examine how the beneﬁt level aﬀects the
fraction of days on partial beneﬁts during the compensated spell of unemployment. The
nonemployment spells as well as the UI beneﬁt spells are censored at two years.
In table 1 we report descriptive statistics for the whole estimation sample described
above as well as the sample around the kink point. Panel A describes our outcome vari-
ables and panel B shows descriptive statistics for individual characteristics. As discussed
above we consider unemployment outcomes including the UI duration, total nonemploy-
ment duration and the share of UI beneﬁt days that is spent on partial beneﬁts, i.e. in
subsidized part-time or temporary employment. We also examine the share of UI beneﬁt
spells ending in employment and in order to analyze the quality of the post-unemployment
jobs we consider the wage and duration of the next job.6 To get a more comprehensive pic-
ture of post-unemployment outcomes, we also consider working days and earnings within
the ﬁrst two years following the beginning of the unemployment spell.
In all our outcome measures, the diﬀerences between the full sample and the sample
around the kink point are in line with the fact that the kink point is situated in the upper
part of the wage distribution. The average previous daily wage in the full sample is 87
EUR which is 19 percent lower than the kink point of 107 EUR. Workers around the kink
point ﬁnd a new job somewhat faster than an average UI recipient (218 versus 231 days),
and their new jobs are higher paid and last longer on average. The main diﬀerences in
individual characteristics between the full sample and the sample around the kink point
also stem from the location of the kink point slightly higher than the mean in the wage
distribution. The sample around the kink point has a slightly lower share of women and
is somewhat higher educated. Our sample does not include workers who have voluntarily
quit their jobs and who are therefore subject to a 90-day waiting period, and therefore the
rather low share of dismissed workers reﬂects the large share of workers who have been
employed with ﬁxed-term contracts prior to unemployment.
5 Graphical evidence
The key identifying assumption in our RKD analysis is that conditional on ε, the density
of the past wage is smooth at the wage cutoﬀ w∗. This smooth density condition rules out
(perfect) manipulation of the assignment variable at the kink point. Figure 2 shows the
number of unemployment spells by bins of 1 EUR relative to the cutoﬀ. The graph shows
no signs of discontinuity in the number of spells close to the cutoﬀ. A formal McCrary test
6The wage and duration of the next job are set to 0 for those who are not re-employed. The measure for
pre-unemployment wage is the actual wage used in calculating the UI beneﬁt and subject to a proportional
deduction due to pension insurance payments. Therefore it is not directly comparable to the post-
unemployment wage which is registered without the deduction.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for full sample and sample around the kink point
Full sample Around kink
Mean SD Mean SD
A. Outcomes
UI duration (days) 141 137 136 135
Time to next job (days, censored 2 years) 231 253 218 244
Fraction of partial unemployment in UI days 0.05 0.16 0.04 0.14
Re-employment probability 0.83 0.37 0.85 0.36
Duration of next job (days) 336 531 380 572
Daily wage of next job (euros) 86.7 43.8 98.9 47.4
Working days within next 2 years 305 195 314 187
Earnings within next 2 years 22,504 20,236 26,525 20,597
B. Covariates
Daily wage used to determine UI beneﬁt 86.70 22.60 106.00 5.73
Daily UI beneﬁt 55.40 9.17 64.30 3.98
Dismissed 0.06 0.23 0.08 0.27
Age 38.10 9.43 38.30 9.04
Female 0.61 0.49 0.45 0.50
Helsinki metropolitan area 0.14 0.34 0.17 0.37
Occupation:
Scientiﬁc, technical, arts 0.17 0.28
Healthcare, social workers 0.21 0.12
Administrative, clerical, IT 0.10 0.08
Commercial 0.06 0.04
Agriculture, forestry, ﬁshing 0.04 0.02
Transportation 0.03 0.04
Construction and mining 0.10 0.15
Manufacturing I 0.12 0.14
Manufacturing II 0.04 0.05
Service workers 0.11 0.06
Other 0.03 0.02
Education:
Compulsory or missing 0.22 0.19
Secondary 0.62 0.55
Tertiary 0.17 0.27
Observations 199,011 31,359
Notes: The around-the-kink sample includes those unemployed whose previous daily wage deviates from
the cutoﬀ value by 10 EUR or less. The group Manufacturing I includes painters, textile, metal, ma-
chinery, electrical and wood workers and the group Manufacturing II includes handicraft, printing, food
processing, chemical processing, paper production and machine operators in energy production and water
supply and treatment.
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Figure 2: Number of unemployment spells (bin size = 1 EUR)
as usually conducted in the regression discontinuity design literature also shows no lack of
continuity at the kink.7 Card et al. (2015) also extend the idea of the McCrary test to the
RKD by testing the assumption of the continuity of the derivative of the density function.
The number of observations in each bin is regressed on polynomials of previous earnings
(centered at the cutoﬀ) and the interaction term. When we do a similar exercise, the
coeﬃcient of the interaction term for the ﬁrst order polynomial is insigniﬁcant, indicating
that the smoothness assumption is not violated.
The regression kink design also requires that the relationship between the covariates
and the outcome variable is smooth around the cutoﬀ point. In order to examine whether
this holds in our set up, we plot mean values of selected covariates in each bin of the
assignment variable. As seen in ﬁgure 3, there are nonlinearities in the relationship be-
tween some covariates and daily wage. We also observe clear kinks, for example, around
−30 EUR in the share of health care and social work employees, and around −10 EUR
in the share of spells beginning in June or July. Nonetheless, the covariates evolve rather
smoothly around the cutoﬀ point and bias-corrected estimates using MSE-optimal band-
widths for each covariate indicate no signiﬁcant kinks in the covariates.8
7Point estimate of log diﬀerence in height is 0.0069 with standard error 0.021.
8We also estimated kinks for the covariates using the MSE-optimal bandwidth for our UI duration
outcome and none of the estimates were signiﬁcant.
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Figure 3: Local averages of selected covariates (bin size = 1 EUR)
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Figure 4: Local averages of outcome variables (bin size = 1 EUR)
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Figure 4 displays the relationship between previous wage and various outcomes. We
observe some nonlinearities in the relationship between previous wage and the outcomes,
which are likely to be associated with compositional changes in the underlying population
as we also see nonlinearities in the covariates. Due to these nonlinearities, the local linear
model can ﬁt the data well only for relatively short bandwidths, i.e. bandwiths of 30
EUR at a maximum. Wider bandwiths call for higher order polynomials and/or controls
for observed characteristics. Focusing on the cutoﬀ, there appears to be some evidence of
kinks at the wage cutoﬀ, most notably for the fraction of partial unemployment.
6 Regression kink estimates
6.1 Conventional local linear models
The graphical evidence in ﬁgure 4 suggests that the local linear model could ﬁt the data
well near the wage cutoﬀ but is likely to be too restrictive for wider bandwidths. As such
we restrict our local linear regression analysis to bandwidths between 10 and 30 EUR.
We do not report results for smaller bandwidths which are very noisy and essentially
uninformative. Figure 5 shows estimated elasticities of the outcomes with respect to the
UI beneﬁt level as well as 95% conﬁdence intervals from linear speciﬁcations without
control variables for a range of bandwidths. The bandwidths are measured as euros of
daily wage and the elasticities are calculated at the mean UI beneﬁt and mean of the
outcome for each separate bandwidth. Bias-corrected estimates with robust conﬁdence
intervals for various optimal bandwidth selection methods are reported and discussed in
the next section.
Considering the absence of clearly visible kinks in ﬁgure 4, it is unsurprising that
many of the elasticity estimates are not statistically signiﬁcant. The estimated eﬀect
of the UI beneﬁt level on UI duration is positive but insigniﬁcant at small bandwidths
and hovers around zero as the bandwidth widens. The point estimates for the elasticity
of nonemployment duration are positive across the whole range of bandwidths but very
imprecise especially when using narrow bandwidths. The estimated eﬀect on the fraction
of partial unemployment is, on the other hand, negative and signiﬁcant for all but the
smallest bandwidths. It therefore appears that decreasing the UI beneﬁt level would
induce unemployed workers to take up more part-time or temporary employment. The
elasticity estimates are quite large in absolute value, but should be considered in the
context of the rather low average share of partial unemployment. The estimates indicate
that a 1% decrease in the UI beneﬁt level would increase the share of partial unemployment
days in the UI spell by approximately 5%, i.e. from an average of 4% to 4.2%. It should be
noted that this is a combination of more unemployed workers taking partial beneﬁts and
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those on partial beneﬁts receiving partial beneﬁts for a larger share of their total time on
UI beneﬁts. On average 10% of UI spells include time on partial beneﬁts, and conditional
on receipt of partial beneﬁts, the share of partial unemployment days is approximately
40%.
Looking next at the eﬀect of the UI beneﬁt level on the re-employment probability,
the elasticity estimates in ﬁgure 5 are negative, but only barely signiﬁcant at a few band-
widths. A negative estimate would imply that higher beneﬁts lower the re-employment
probability, but even though the eﬀect is more precisely estimated at wider bandwidths,
we lack statistical power to be able to say anything conclusive. The estimated elasticity of
the duration of the ﬁrst job after re-employment is positive and around 1, but again statis-
tically insigniﬁcant with very wide conﬁdence intervals at smaller bandwidths. The wage
in the ﬁrst job after unemployment appears to be aﬀected negatively by the UI beneﬁt
level, with the elasticity estimates in ﬁgure 5 mostly around −0.5. This would imply that
potentially longer nonemployment durations related to higher UI beneﬁts (though such
an eﬀect is not statistically signifcant in the top-right graph) could lead to a relatively
lower wage due to e.g. discrimination by employers or human capital depreciation.
The estimates for the eﬀect of the UI beneﬁt level on the number of working days
within two years of the beginning of the unemployment spell are slightly negative but
again only signiﬁcant at a few bandwidths. This potentially negative eﬀect would of course
bemechanically inﬂuenced by any increase in unemployment or nonemployment duration
stemming from a higher UI beneﬁt level, but there is little evidence of such eﬀects. All
in all, any positive eﬀect that a higher UI beneﬁt level may have on the duration of
the ﬁrst post-unemployment job appears to not compensate for prolonged unemployment
or the adverse employment eﬀects of not taking up part-time or temporary work. The
estimates for earnings in the ﬁrst two years after the beginning of the unemployment spell
indicate that a higher UI beneﬁt level decreases earnings within the next two years with
an elasticity of roughly −1. This result obviously combines any actual wage eﬀect implied
by a lower post-unemployment wage and the potential eﬀect of prolonged unemployment
and subsequently less time employed.
To sum up, the elasticity estimates in ﬁgure 5 are relatively insensitive with respect
to the bandwidth choice but rather imprecise. We ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant negative
eﬀects on the fraction of part-time unemployment and earnings within the next two years.
The eﬀects on the duration and wage of the next job are only marginally signiﬁcant. Other
eﬀects have expected sign but are too imprecisely estimated for any conclusions.
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Figure 5: Conventional elasticity estimates from local linear models at varying bandwidths
along with 95% conﬁdence intervals
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6.2 Bias-corrected estimates
To study the robustness of the results depicted in the ﬁgures above, we next present both
conventional and bias-corrected estimates from linear and quadratic speciﬁcations using
diﬀerent bandwidth selection methods.9 Tables 2 and 3 show results for unemployment
and post-unemployment outcomes respectively. Columns 1 to 3 in table 2 display results
for linear speciﬁcations and columns 4 to 6 show results for quadratic speciﬁcations. The
conventional elasticity estimates from the linear speciﬁcations correspond to the estimates
in ﬁgure 5. For both the linear and quadratic speciﬁcations three alternative bandwidth
selection methods are used: the MSE-optimal bandwidth, the MSE-optimal bandwidth
without the regularization term and the CER-optimal bandwidth. Generally the CER-
optimal bandwidths are very narrow, about half the MSE-optimal bandwidth, leading to
very large standard errors.
Looking ﬁrst at the UI duration, the elasticity estimates vary somewhat depending on
the estimation method used, with the bias-corrected estimates slightly higher in general.
The bias-corrected estimates range from 0.9 to 3.8 and are quite noisy, with especially the
narrow CER-optimal bandwidths leading to very large standard errors. Using the MSE-
optimal bandwidth for the linear speciﬁcation, the elasticity estimates of 3.0 and 3.8 are
statistically signiﬁcant, albeit quite high compared to the other point estimates from linear
models at wider bandwidths. They are more in line with the elasticity estimates from
quadratic speciﬁcations, which also are rather large but mainly statistically insigniﬁcant.
Turning to the elasticity estimates for the time to the next job, i.e. nonemployment du-
ration, the bias-corrected estimates are again larger than the conventional estimates. Us-
ing the narrow CER-optimal bandwidth the estimates are higher than at the MSE-optimal
bandwidths, but the standard errors are also large leading to essentially uninformative
results. The wider MSE-optimal bandwidths without regularization yield bias-corrected
elasticities of 1.5 and 1.6 for the linear and quadratic speciﬁcations respectively, with the
quadratic estimate statistically signiﬁcant. The elasticity of 1.6 would imply a 3.5 day
increase in the nonemployment duration if the UI beneﬁt level increased by 1%. There
is only one prior estimate obtained from Finnish data for the elasticity of unemployment
duration w.r.t. the UI beneﬁt level. Uusitalo and Verho (2010) ﬁnd an elasticity of 0.8,
but this is for a speciﬁc group of unemployed entitled to increased UI beneﬁts for the ﬁrst
150 days of unemployment and thereby not necessarily generalizable. For the time to next
job Carling et al. (2001) ﬁnd an elasticity of 1.6 w.r.t. to the beneﬁt level in Sweden,
which is in line with our bias-corrected estimates at the MSE-optimal bandwidths without
regularization.
The elasticity estimates in ﬁgure 5 implied that the fraction of time spent on partial
9We use the rdrobust package (Calonico et al. 2016b) for these estimations
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Table 2: Conventional and bias-corrected elasticity estimates using competing optimal
bandwidth choices for unemployment outcomes
Linear models Quadratic models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UI duration
Bandwidth 8.59 12.45 4.67 17.73 36.86 8.83
Conventional elasticity 3.02** 0.29 -0.19 2.10 1.57*** 2.41
Conventional std error [1.29] [0.74] [3.25] [1.72] [0.56] [4.94]
Bias-corrected elasticity 3.84** 1.14 0.93 2.31 1.70 3.24
CCT robust std error [1.90] [1.64] [5.19] [2.37] [1.09] [6.65]
Time to next job
Bandwidth 12.88 15.06 7.00 19.55 58.47 9.74
Conventional elasticity 0.87 0.73 2.60 2.04 1.53*** 4.67
Conventional std error [0.79] [0.62] [1.99] [1.67] [0.34] [4.83]
Bias-corrected elasticity 0.96 1.48 3.58 1.59 1.62** 6.37
CCT robust std error [1.24] [1.04] [3.41] [2.28] [0.82] [6.45]
Fraction of partial unemployment
Bandwidth 11.85 16.40 6.44 14.76 54.66 7.35
Conventional elasticity -7.25** -5.43*** -1.25 -5.19 -4.86*** 11.81
Conventional std error [3.11] [1.82] [8.08] [8.53] [0.95] [26.90]
Bias-corrected elasticity -9.04** -7.56** 1.86 -1.72 -4.48 6.68
CCT robust std error [4.52] [3.11] [12.82] [11.13] [7.80] [34.14]
Re-employment probability
Bandwidth 10.39 22.30 5.65 20.95 38.78 10.43
Conventional elasticity -0.01 -0.10 0.61 -0.49 -0.42* 1.34
Conventional std error [0.41] [0.13] [1.03] [0.56] [0.22] [1.64]
Bias-corrected elasticity -0.28 -0.24 1.54 -0.44 -0.18 2.53
CCT robust std error [0.60] [0.43] [1.64] [0.77] [0.48] [2.21]
Bandwidth selection MSE MSE no reg CER MSE MSE no reg CER
Polynomial order for point estimate 1 1 1 2 2 2
Polynomial order for bias correction 2 2 2 3 3 3
unemployment beneﬁts would increase if the UI beneﬁt level decreased. This also shows
up in the bias-corrected estimates in table 2, where the elasticity of partial unemployment
w.r.t. the UI beneﬁt level is negative except at the very narrow CER-optimal bandwidths.
The standard errors for the bias-corrected estimates using the CER-optimal bandwidths
are again very large leading to uninformative point estimates. The bias-corrected esti-
mates from the linear speciﬁcation at the MSE-optimal bandwidth with and without the
regularization term indicate elasticities of −9 and −7.5 respectively. As discussed above
related to ﬁgure 5, the average share of partial unemployment days in an UI spell is quite
low and conceals a high share of partial unemployment conditional on taking up any par-
tial unemployment beneﬁts. The elasticity of −9 implies that a 1% decrease in the UI
beneﬁt level would lead to a 0.4 percentage point increase in the fraction of time spent
on partial unemployment beneﬁts. Although this is a small increase, it does indicate that
lower beneﬁts induce the unemployed to take up part-time or temporary jobs. The bias-
corrected estimates for elasticity of the re-employment probability w.r.t the UI beneﬁt
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level in table 2 are also negative except for the narrow CER-optimal bandwidths, but all
the estimates are statistically insigniﬁcant. Considering the noisy conventional elasticity
estimates in ﬁgure 5, this is not surprising.
Table 3 shows the elasticity estimates for post-unemployment outcomes. As with
the unemployment outcomes, estimates from both linear and quadratic speciﬁcations for
various optimal bandwidth selection methods are shown. The bias-corrected elasticity
estimate of the duration of the next job w.r.t the UI beneﬁt level is not robust to diﬀerent
polynomial orders and bandwidths. The point estimates are mostly positive, but very im-
precise. For the ﬁrst post-unemployment wage the bias-corrected elasticity estimates are
negative except when using the narrow CER-optimal bandwidth in the quadratic spec-
iﬁcation. The narrow bandwidths lead, once again, to very large standard errors. The
bias-corrected estimates using the MSE-optimal bandwidths with and without regulariza-
tion range from −0.25 to −1.4 but are not statistically signiﬁcant. In line with ﬁgure 5,
the conventional elasticity estimate at the MSE-optimal bandwidth without regularization
is −0.79 and statistically signiﬁcant.
Working days within the two years following the beginning of the unemployment spell
appear to be slightly negatively aﬀected by a higher level of UI beneﬁts. The bias-
corrected elasticity estimates are negative across the board, but again the narrow CER-
optimal bandwidths are associated with very large standard errors. The point estimates
with larger absolute values (−2.2 and −2.6 in linear and quadratic models) are marginally
signiﬁcant implying that a 1% increase in the UI beneﬁt level would lead to a 7 to 8 day
decrease in the number of working days in the following two years. As discussed above,
such an eﬀect is consistent with a longer initial unemployment duration and less time
spent in part-time and temporary employment. Bias-corrected elasticity estimates for
earnings in the two years after the beginning of the unemployment spell are also negative
except at the narrow CER-optimal bandwidths. The linear speciﬁcation with the wider
MSE-optimal bandwidth without the regularization term yields a statistically signiﬁcant
elasticity estimate of −1. Such a decrease in earnings due to higher UI beneﬁts is in line
with our ﬁndings of lower post-unemployment wages and less working days in subsequent
years.
6.3 Higher order polynomials and larger bandwidths
Most of the nonparametric estimates above are quite noisy. To increase statistical power
of the analysis we also conduct a more parametric analysis using larger subsets of the data.
Because the relationships between the outcome variables and daily wage become clearly
nonlinear when we move away from the wage cutoﬀ (see ﬁgure 4), it is quite obvious that
the linear model does not ﬁt to the data well when large bandwidths are used and hence
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Table 3: Conventional and bias-corrected elasticity estimates using competing optimal
bandwidth choices for post-unemployment outcomes
Linear models Quadratic models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Duration of next job
Bandwidth 9.38 13.66 5.10 12.98 32.56 6.46
Conventional elasticity 0.36 1.36 6.20 3.83 0.01 22.12*
Conventional std error [1.72] [0.98] [4.27] [4.26] [1.07] [12.05]
Bias-corrected elasticity 0.35 2.56 11.10 3.41 -0.81 25.56
CCT robust std error [2.70] [2.06] [7.41] [5.92] [8.11] [16.34]
Wage of next job
Bandwidth 7.71 11.61 4.19 13.68 24.98 6.81
Conventional elasticity -0.73 -0.79** -0.46 -1.14 -0.73 0.58
Conventional std error [0.74] [0.40] [1.86] [1.25] [0.52] [3.59]
Bias corrected elasticity -0.70 -1.27 -0.74 -1.40 -0.25 0.59
CCT robust std error [1.16] [0.91] [3.21] [1.71] [0.98] [4.78]
Working days within next 2 years
Bandwidth 7.60 9.56 4.13 13.71 19.19 6.83
Conventional elasticity -1.43 -0.60 -0.85 -0.79 -1.99** 0.66
Conventional std error [0.93] [0.66] [2.33] [1.51] [0.91] [4.36]
Bias-corrected elasticity -2.23* -1.39 -1.58 -1.49 -2.64* -0.09
CCT robust std error [1.27] [1.06] [3.40] [1.99] [1.42] [5.59]
Earnings within next 2 years
Bandwidth 10.77 19.25 5.85 13.21 26.65 6.58
Conventional elasticity -1.35 -0.61* 1.00 -0.87 -1.80** 3.87
Conventional std error [0.83] [0.33] [1.74] [2.14] [0.85] [6.25]
Bias-corrected elasticity -1.58 -0.98** 2.60 -0.61 -2.05 4.16
CCT robust std error [1.15] [0.41] [2.63] [2.91] [2.05] [8.42]
Bandwidth selection MSE MSE no reg CER MSE MSE no reg CER
Polynomial order for point estimate 1 1 1 2 2 2
Polynomial order for bias correction 2 2 2 3 3 3
higher order polynomial models are called for. We consider polynomial models of orders 1
to 3, with and without control variables. In tables 4 and 5 we report elasticity estimates
for bandwidths ranging from 10 to 55 EUR from the speciﬁcation with the lowest value
of the Akaike information criterion.10 The estimates in panel A are from the speciﬁcation
outlined in (6), whereas the estimates in panel B are from an augmented speciﬁcation that
include controls for the year and month of unemployment entry, gender, the number of
children, interactions between the number of children and gender, education, occupation,
age, capital region and a dummy for dismissed workers.
In the local analysis, the control variables do not contribute to identiﬁcation but their
inclusion may reduce sample noise and hence lead to more precise elasticity estimates.
Their inclusion also provides a useful robustness check, as the point estimates should not
10For most outcomes the estimates from the linear models are sensitive with respect to the bandwidth,
whereas the estimates from quadratic and cubic models remain quite stable after a certain value of the
bandwidth (typically around 30 EUR).
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Table 4: Elasticity estimates for unemployment outcomes at varying bandwidths based
on a polynomial model with the lowest Akaike information criterion
Fraction of partial Re-employment
UI duration Time to next job unemployment probability
BW N Pol. Elasticity (SE) Pol. Elasticity (SE) Pol. Elasticity (SE) Pol. Elasticity (SE)
Panel A. No covariates
10 31,359 2 8.08* (4.10) 1 1.05 (1.16) 1 -4.58 (4.08) 1 -0.02 (0.43)
15 48,689 2 2.90 (2.24) 2 1.77 (2.53) 1 -7.13*** (2.31) 2 1.07 (0.95)
20 67,621 3 5.23 (3.65) 1 0.30 (0.42) 3 0.97 (14.53) 3 1.94 (1.56)
25 88,756 3 3.99 (2.63) 1 0.44 (0.31) 1 -4.89*** (1.11) 1 -0.14 (0.12)
30 111,352 3 0.47 (2.03) 1 0.07 (0.24) 1 -4.56*** (0.87) 1 -0.11 (0.09)
35 134,169 3 0.91 (1.63) 3 1.82 (1.83) 2 -9.06*** (2.70) 1 -0.06 (0.07)
40 155,990 3 1.39 (1.35) 3 1.69 (1.52) 2 -8.49*** (2.25) 3 -0.17 (0.57)
45 174,392 3 1.43 (1.16) 3 1.42 (1.3) 2 -8.38*** (1.94) 2 -0.54** (0.20)
50 188,836 3 1.89* (1.01) 3 2.23* (1.13) 2 -7.69*** (1.70) 2 -0.54*** (0.18)
55 199,011 2 1.03** (0.38) 2 1.89*** (0.43) 2 -7.71*** (1.51) 2 -0.66*** (0.16)
Panel B. With covariates
10 31,359 2 8.27** (3.92) 1 1.31 (1.12) 1 -3.12 (4.03) 1 -0.12 (0.43)
15 48,689 2 2.66 (2.14) 2 1.79 (2.44) 1 -5.16** (2.28) 1 -0.54** (0.24)
20 67,621 2 1.67 (1.42) 1 0.40 (0.41) 1 -4.23** (1.52) 1 -0.16 (0.16)
25 88,756 3 4.97* (2.52) 1 0.46 (0.30) 1 -3.03** (1.10) 1 -0.15 (0.11)
30 111,352 2 0.90 (0.79) 1 0.08 (0.24) 1 -2.64*** (0.86) 1 -0.10 (0.09)
35 134,169 2 0.63 (0.65) 3 2.17 (1.77) 2 -7.28** (2.67) 1 -0.06 (0.07)
40 155,990 3 1.01 (1.30) 3 1.65 (1.47) 2 -6.22** (2.23) 2 -0.50** (0.23)
45 174,392 3 1.01 (1.11) 3 1.35 (1.26) 2 -5.56*** (1.92) 2 -0.51** (0.20)
50 188,836 2 0.61 (0.41) 3 1.96* (1.10) 2 -4.47** (1.68) 2 -0.52*** (0.18)
55 199,011 2 0.40 (0.37) 2 1.73*** (0.41) 2 -4.61*** (1.50) 2 -0.64*** (0.16)
Notes: BW = bandwidth. N = Number of observations. Pol. = Order of the polynomial function chosen
on the basis of the Akaike information criterion. Elasticities in panel B are from models that include
controls for the year and month of unemployment entry, gender, the number of children, interactions
between the number of children and gender, education, occupation, age, capital region and a dummy for
dismissed workers. The standard errors in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.
change notably. A comparison of the models for larger bandwidths is less straightfor-
ward. The kinks in the relationships between the background characteristics and daily
wage in ﬁgure 3 raise some doubts about the smoothness assumption of the wage eﬀect in
the unconditional models when large bandwidths are used. The inclusion of control vari-
ables can mitigate confounding nonlinearities due to nonsmooth changes in the (observed)
composition of the workers across the wage distribution (Aldo 2016). In the case of large
bandwidths the smoothness assumption may therefore be more likely to be valid and the
RKD estimates more reliable when we condition on the covariates. A counter argument
is that the kinks in the distributions of observed characteristics make also kinks in the
distribution of unobserved characteristics more likely, and thereby the RKD estimates
should be treated with caution.
The results in tables 4 and 5 show that the point estimates from our parametric
analysis are in general relatively stable across the range of bandwidths and, given the same
polynomial degree, the estimates are not sensitive to the inclusion of control variables.
Somewhat larger diﬀerences emerge for wider bandwiths but this is to be expected. The
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elasticity of the UI duration w.r.t the UI beneﬁt level is around 1 but the estimates are
rather imprecise and not robust to the inclusion of control variables. The elasticity of
the time to next job is slightly higher at just below 2. This estimate is robust to the
inclusion of covariates when the bandwidth is at least 35 EUR. For bandwidths between
15 to 30 EUR the elasticity from the quadratic model is also around 2, with an AIC
only marginally higher than for the linear model reported in the table. These elasticity
estimates are around the same magnitude as our bias-corrected nonparametric estimates
for nonemployment duration and since they increase in precision with the increase in
bandwidth and addition of covariates, this robustness check is reassuring in terms of
tackling the lack of suﬃcient data in the vicinity of the cutoﬀ for this outcome.
As in our previous results, the elasticity of partial unemployment is large in absolute
value. The estimate appears sensitive to the inclusion of covariates and bandwidth, but is
consistently negative across the range of bandwidths. The elasticity of the re-employment
probability is robust around −0.5 at larger bandwidths and up to a bandwidth of 25 EUR
the quadratic and cubic estimates are quite similar and only marginally dominated by the
linear model reported in the table. These estimates are slightly higher in absolute value
than our bias-corrected nonparametric estimates and more precise.
The results for the post-unemployment outcomes in table 5 indicate that the elastic-
ity of the duration of the next job is around 1 but, as in our previous results for this
outcome, this estimate is not very robust. The elasticity of the wage in the ﬁrst job
after unemployment is negative and statistically signiﬁcant at most bandwidths, varying
around −0.5 and −1.5 , which is about the same magnitude as our other results for this
outcome. These two indicators of post-unemployment job quality are in contrast with
each other. It should be noted that the results for the duration of the next job are not
very robust, but the opposing eﬀects could indicate that higher beneﬁts enable workers
to wait for more stable job oﬀers but this comes at the cost of relatively lower wages.
Looking at employment in the longer term, the elasticity of working days in the next two
years is around −1 but imprecisely estimated except for the largest bandwidths. Our
bias-corrected nonparametric estimates varied somewhat depending on the bandwidth se-
lection method and were about the same or slightly higher in absolute value. It appears
that if higher UI beneﬁts have a positive eﬀect on the duration of the ﬁrst job after un-
employment, this is not suﬃcient to compensate for the longer nonemployment duration
induced by higher beneﬁts. The elasticity of earnings in the next two years ranges from
−1.5 to −2, which is in line with our previous results for post-unemployment earnings,
but the results here are more precise. This indicates that the combination of a lower
post-unemployment wage and less working days in subsequent years quite clearly leads to
a substantial negative eﬀect of the UI beneﬁt level on earnings.
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Table 5: Elasticity estimates for post-unemployment outcomes at varying bandwidths
based on a polynomial model with the lowest Akaike information criterion
Working days within Earnings within
Duration of next job Wage of next job next 2 years next 2 years
BW N Pol. Elasticity (SE) Pol. Elasticity (SE) Pol. Elasticity (SE) Pol. Elasticity (SE)
Panel A. No covariates
10 31,359 1 1.23 (1.56) 1 -0.56 (0.50) 1 -0.36 (0.62) 1 -0.99 (0.83)
15 48,689 1 1.11 (0.86) 1 -0.68** (0.28) 2 -1.31 (1.34) 2 -1.08 (1.81)
20 67,621 1 0.97* (0.57) 2 -1.41* (0.72) 3 -0.90 (2.19) 2 -2.37* (1.27)
25 88,756 1 0.68 (0.42) 1 -0.32** (0.14) 3 -2.73* (1.58) 3 -3.51 (2.45)
30 111,352 1 0.70** (0.33) 2 -1.05** (0.41) 1 -0.09 (0.13) 3 -2.21 (1.71)
35 134,169 2 -0.19 (1.00) 3 -1.05 (0.81) 3 -1.63 (0.98) 2 -1.88*** (0.56)
40 155,990 3 2.09 (2.05) 3 -0.58 (0.68) 3 -1.28 (0.82) 3 -2.60** (1.20)
45 174,392 3 2.05 (1.74) 2 -1.30*** (0.25) 3 -1.27* (0.7) 2 -1.23*** (0.43)
50 188,836 3 0.19 (1.53) 2 -1.12*** (0.22) 3 -1.57** (0.61) 3 -2.37** (0.90)
55 199,011 2 -0.08 (0.57) 3 -2.23*** (0.46) 2 -0.90*** (0.23) 3 -2.29*** (0.81)
Panel B. With covariates
10 31,359 1 1.37 (1.49) 1 -0.53 (0.49) 1 -0.48 (0.60) 1 -1.16 (0.81)
15 48,689 1 1.34 (0.82) 1 -0.64** (0.27) 2 -1.36 (1.30) 2 -1.19 (1.76)
20 67,621 1 1.51** (0.55) 2 -1.57** (0.70) 3 -0.81 (2.12) 2 -2.63** (1.24)
25 88,756 1 1.09** (0.40) 1 -0.22 (0.14) 1 -0.19 (0.16) 1 -0.73*** (0.26)
30 111,352 1 0.93*** (0.31) 2 -0.77* (0.40) 1 -0.03 (0.13) 2 -1.43** (0.70)
35 134,169 1 1.14*** (0.25) 3 -1.27 (0.79) 3 -1.85* (0.95) 2 -1.53** (0.55)
40 155,990 1 1.07*** (0.22) 2 -0.95*** (0.28) 3 -1.19 (0.79) 3 -2.47** (1.18)
45 174,392 3 3.12* (1.66) 2 -0.94*** (0.24) 3 -1.12 (0.67) 2 -1.01** (0.43)
50 188,836 3 1.71 (1.46) 2 -0.86*** (0.21) 2 -0.60** (0.25) 2 -0.96** (0.38)
55 199,011 2 0.29 (0.54) 3 -1.64*** (0.45) 2 -0.75*** (0.22) 3 -1.81** (0.80)
Notes: BW = bandwidth. N = Number of observations. Pol. = Order of the polynomial function chosen
on the basis of the Akaike information criterion. Elasticities in panel B are from models that include
controls for the year and month of unemployment entry, gender, the number of children, interactions
between the number of children and gender, education, occupation, age, capital region and a dummy for
dismissed workers. The standard errors in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.
6.4 Robustness checks
As a comparison, we also estimate bias-corrected nonparametric elasticities of our various
outcomes using linear and quadratic speciﬁcations for a range of bandwidths.11 The
estimates are generally in line with those in tables 4 and 5. The bias-corrected estimates
for the elasticity of the next job duration are not robust across the bandwidth range, as
was the case in our other analyses. For the other outcomes, the bias-corrected estimates
are relatively stable across the range of bandwidths. As a further robustness check, we
also consider covariate adjusted bias-corrected elasticity estimates introduced in Calonico
et al. (2016a). We estimate linear and quadratic speciﬁcations such as in tables 2 and 3
but with covariate-adjusted point estimates and covariate-adjusted robust bias-corrected
conﬁdence intervals. The results are in general similar to those in tables 2 and 3 and no
notable increase in precision is achieved.12
11Results not shown, available on request. The pilot bandwidth used for estimating the bias was set
to be equal to the main bandwidth. See Calonico et al. (2016a) for discussion.
12Results not shown, available on request.
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Figure 6: Conventional local linear elasticity estimates for placebo cutoﬀs along with 95%
conﬁdence intervals (bandwidth = 15 EUR around each placebo cutoﬀ)
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In addition to varying bandwidths and alternative estimation methods we also consider
the robustness of our results by examining the eﬀect of the UI beneﬁt level on outcomes
at diﬀerent cutoﬀ points. In ﬁgure 6 we provide elasticity estimates from local linear
regressions similar to those in ﬁgure 5 but for placebo cutoﬀ points. The true value of
the cutoﬀ is at 0 in each ﬁgure and the p-value indicates the fraction of estimates that
are larger in absolute value than the estimate at the true cutoﬀ. The outcomes for which
the results have been consistent in our other robustness checks are also clearest here, i.e.
the share of partial unemployment in the UI spell and earnings within two years of the
beginning of the unemployment spell. For the other outcomes it is harder to distinguish
the estimates at the true cutoﬀ from the placebo estimates. Given that the elasticity
estimates for e.g. unemployment duration were small and imprecise, it is unsurprising that
a large fraction of the placebo estimates are larger than the actual estimates. Moreover,
for several outcomes there are clearly distinguishable signiﬁcant placebo estimates that
coincide with the kinks in the share of health care and social workers and the month of
unemployment entry, that is, when the placebo cutoﬀ is smaller than the true one (see
ﬁgure 3). Therefore, it appears that the changes in workforce composition across the
wage distribution are inﬂuencing these estimates. As discussed in the previous section,
this should be taken into account when using observations further away from the cutoﬀ by
applying quadratic or even higher order polynomial models and/or by including control
variables in the analysis.
7 Conclusions
Research on the eﬀects of the UI beneﬁt level on labor market outcomes other than un-
employment duration is scarce and the results are mixed. In this study we have provided
further evidence on the eﬀects of the UI beneﬁt level on unemployment and subsequent
labor market outcomes. To identify the causal eﬀect of the UI beneﬁt level, we exploited
a kink in the relationship between the previous wage and UI beneﬁts in Finland. We
used a large register based data set with accurate information on the UI beneﬁt level and
previous wage which allowed us to apply a sharp regression kink design. We compared
diﬀerent nonparametric estimation methods proposed in the literature on regression kink
design and similar to previous studies our results were quite sensitive to choices regarding
polynomial order and bandwidth. Despite the large data and accurate beneﬁt and wage
information, our nonparametric estimates were rather imprecise regardless of the poly-
nomial order and bandwidth selection method. Results from speciﬁcations with added
covariates estimated using larger samples were more precise and generally of the same
magnitude as nonparametric estimates from our other speciﬁcations.
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We found robust evidence that the UI beneﬁt level has a large negative eﬀect on
the share of days spent on partial unemployment beneﬁts during the UI spell, i.e. the
time spent in subsidized part-time or temporary employment. Also the ﬁndings for post-
unemployment earnings were robust to varying estimation methods: Our results showed
that the wage in the ﬁrst job after unemployment and also subsequent earnings in the two
years after the beginning of the unemployment spell decrease with an increase in the UI
beneﬁt level. Results for other outcomes were more sensitive to the choice of speciﬁcation,
but our ﬁndings indicate that higher UI beneﬁts also increase the nonemployment duration
and decrease the re-employment probability and number of working days in the next two
years. We also examined the duration of UI beneﬁt receipt and the duration of the ﬁrst
post-unemployment job, but the results for these outcomes were inconclusive.
In summary, we found no evidence of positive eﬀects on match quality for the UI
beneﬁts, and thereby the overall eﬀect of higher UI beneﬁts on labor market outcomes
over the two-year period is unambiguously negative.
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